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ABSTRACT: To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to 
biochemical intervention. In Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for 
Racial Injustice, Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism 
in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from 
non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper I argue the psychological sciences can 
accommodate several of  Kahn’s criticisms by adopting a situated approach to cognition, where we 
take environmental features as integral to the cognitive processes that manifest racial bias. 
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1. Introduction 
To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical 
intervention. In Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice, Kahn 
(2018) offers a critique of  the science of  implicit bias on grounds that it tends to biologise racism.  The 1
problem isn’t about any specific details concerning the scientific data itself. Rather, the problem 
concerns how scientists frame racism: in treating racism as a biological, cognitive and individualistic 
phenomenon, it neglects that historical and social factors that shape racism. Moreover, this is 
problematic because it can take attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to 
 Kahn offers numerous examples, among which include Poussaint (2002), Eberhardt (2005), Kang 1
(2005), Stanley, Phelps and Banaji (2006), Kubota, Banaji and Phelps (2012), Banaji and Greenwald 
(2013), and Sheepers, Ellemers and Derks (2013).
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racism. At its most extreme form, it can result in the recommendation of  a pill for racism (e.g. the beta 
blocker propranolol), which seeks to cure the individual of  their racism.   2
In making his case, Kahn sometimes overplays his hand. For example, he notes that in the 
“biologized framing, racism is not social, it is not historical, nor is it even interpersonal or medical in 
some general sense; rather, it is constructed mechanistically as being generated by the neurotransmitter 
norepinephrine” (pg. 219). Most scientists are well aware of  the historical causes of  racism, especially 
within the U.S context, and some do prescribe social remedies, e.g. targeting mass media policy with a 
focus on better representations of  ethnic minorities.  However, it would be premature to dismiss all of  3
Kahn’s criticism on strawman charges. As a legal scholar, Kahn is well-placed to warn us of  
opportunity costs. In treating implicit bias as a biologised notion, the dominant trend in the fight for 
racial justice, at least in the U.S, has been to focus on individualistic interventions that ignore the social 
and structural causes of  racism. Furthermore, while the problem lies not in the scientific data itself  but 
in what to make of  it, I think Kahn is also right that scientists often compound the issue in how they 
frame racism.  
For example, in Blind Spot: the Hidden Biases of  Good People, two of  the pioneering researchers on 
implicit bias, Banaji and Greenwald (2013), begin by comparing implicit biases to biological 
phenomena, e.g. our blind spots, visual illusions, imprinting etc., and land on treating such biases as 
‘mind bugs’: roughly problems to do with our categorising capacities gone awry.  Once again, the 4
problem isn’t anything specific concerning their findings. Nevertheless, the overall impression one gets 
from reading this book is that racism today is a fairly natural, mundane phenomenon, on a par with 
other social biases, e.g. biases for people’s attractiveness and job status (their examples). Worse, this is 
something actively encouraged by their conclusion: “in-group favoritism — may be the largest 
contributing factor to the relative disadvantages of  Black Americans and other already disadvantaged 
 E.g. see Terbeck et al. (2012), Douglas (2013), and Cikara and Bavel (2014). See Pustilnik (2012) and 2
DeGrazia (2013) for a discussion.
 Kang (2017) also makes this point in his review of  Race on the Brain.3
 They borrow the term from VanLehn (1990) who uses it to refer to habits of  mental arithmetic, 4
which malfunction when applied to unintended situations.
2
groups” (162). This is a remarkable claim, not least because Jim Crow laws were still in effect as 
recently as 1965. (If  you are keeping count, that’s less than two generations ago). Here I am inclined to 
agree with Kahn that this is a “stunning dismissal of  precisely the sorts of  structural and institutional 
factors” that shape racism (pg. 95).   
Still, I think we should also be sceptical of  Kahn’s conclusion, viz. that a science should ‘inform’ 
but not ‘guide’ anti-racism legislature. This is a murky distinction, which leaves unaddressed one of  the 
most pressing questions raised by Kahn’s critique: how should we make progress in a science to tackle 
racism? This paper aims to answer this question. Unlike Kahn, I think cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience can still play a significant role in shaping law and policy. In particular, I think such 
sciences can accommodate several of  Kahn’s key criticisms by adopting a situated approach to 
cognition, where we take environmental features as integral to the cognitive processes that manifest 
racial bias. In what follows, I provide further background concerning the problems with biologising 
racism (Section 2), spell out my proposal on how to ‘situate’ racism (Section 3), and end by specifying 
both the merits and limitations of  my approach (Section 4).  5
2.   Biologising Racism 
To begin, let us look more closely at both Kahn’s charge that the current science of  implicit bias tends 
to biologise racism and philosophical responses to similar charges made earlier. It is my view that there 
is something important about Kahn’s critique, namely problems to do with framing, which haven’t been 
adequately addressed by philosophical defences of  a psychological science of  racism.  
2.1   Framing Issues 
Kahn’s main foil in Race on the Brain are “behavioral realists —“behavioral” because they are looking 
primarily at the cognitive foundations of  individual attitudes and “realists” because they are grounding 
 Note: though Kahn’s main target is the recent science of  implicit bias, his critique, I take it, also 5
applies to any account of  cognitive bias, be it implicit or explicit, which threatens to biologise racism. 
Subsequently, this paper focusses on problems specifically to do with biologising racism, and will leave 
aside other potential problems with the implicit bias literature.
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their work in rigorous empirical methods and quantitative measurement” (pg. 6).  Behavioural realists 
consist of  a motley of  scientists, mostly working in cognitive psychology and political neuroscience, 
who focus on implicit bias, typically using the implicit association test (IAT), but with an increasing 
emphasis on integrating tools from neuroscience, e.g. data from functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and facial electromyography (EMG). According to Kahn, it is the way behavioural realists 
(mis)use neuroscience which “effectively renders racism primarily a function of  biological activity in the 
brain” (pg. 14), and thereby threatens to biologise racism. 
 But what exactly is it to biologise racism? And why is this problematic? The notion of  
biologising racism can be understood in comparison to the more familiar notion of  biologising race 
itself. According to Kahn, while behavioural realists don’t biologise race, they biologise racism in a 
similar fashion, confusing a social phenomenon for a biological one. This is best seen by example. In 
touting the benefits of  “physical measures of  racial bias”, like fMRI and EMG, another leading 
researcher on implicit bias, Eberhardt, writes that such measures “allow researchers to physically locate 
the phenomena of  interest, such that precise predictions can be made regarding when and where race 
effects will emerge” (2005: 180). For Kahn, this is a prime example of  what he has in mind. As he 
notes: 
Here is where we literally come to find “race on the brain.” The idea of  “physically locating” 
manifestations of  racism in the brain reduces racism to a decontextualized physiological condition 
that tends to displace or obscure understandings of  it as a socially and historically situated 
manifestation of  power relations. (Kahn 2018: 208) 
Now, in a trivial sense, any given human activity can be seen as biological on grounds that it results 
from some physiological process, most likely involving some activity in our brains, which can be tracked 
using physical measures, e.g. fMRI scans. I doubt anyone in the present debate would deny this. To 
biologise racism, for Kahn, is something more specific: it is to treat racism as merely a biological 
phenomenon, obscuring other factors that contribute to racism. Moreover, this can be seen to be a 
problem because it has lead to anti-racism law and policy reform that focus on bringing about 
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psychological changes in individuals at the expense of  tackling social and institutional aspects of  
racism.  6
 At face value, the charge that behavioural realists biologise racism in the aforementioned sense  
is clearly a strawman. Scientists are fully aware that social biases like racism are, well, social. For 
instance, in an interview for Washington Post, Banaji describes the IAT as measuring the “thumbprint of  
the culture on our minds”.  Nor do they (always) dismiss the importance of  history for combating 7
contemporary forms of  racism. For instance, Eberhardt herself, granted more recently, speaks of  
finding ways to “free ourselves from the tight grip of  history” (2020: 95), and goes on to quote the 
political critic Lippmann that history is the “antiseptic” that helps us “to realise more and more clearly 
when our ideas started, where they started, how they came to us, why we accepted them” (1922: 91).  
 That said, I don’t think we should dismiss Kahn out of  hand. While his portrayal of  
behavioural realism isn’t entirely accurate, he draws our attention to something significant. His book is 
awash with real-life examples where diversity-management firms, the U.S Department of  Justice, and 
the American Bar Association, have all, in one form or another, recast antiracism “as a largely private, 
consumer-driven endeavour” (pg. 151); one where implicit bias training is seen as a quick fix for any 
given racist incident, be it in the workplace or concerning law enforcement practice. But this raises an 
important question, namely if  implicit bias researchers themselves are clear on such biases having 
social, historical and institutional elements, why has the uptake of  this research by law and policy 
makers fallen so badly into the trap of  treating all forms of  racial bias as if  they were merely a 
biological phenomenon?  
 My diagnosis is that Kahn is right that scientists working on implicit bias have a framing 
problem. While I don’t think they actually biologise racism, at least not in the way Kahn understands it, 
they do frame contemporary forms of  racial bias as a biological, individual and cognitive phenomenon, 
which inevitably obscures the cultural and institutional structures that continue to prop-up racist 
attitudes and behaviour. As Kahn himself  contends: 
 Similar worries have also been raised by Wellman (2007) and Lawrence (2008).6
 Quoted in Vedantam (2015).7
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My concerns arise primarily from the framing and presentation of  many of  these findings in what 
has tended to approach a grand-master narrative for addressing contemporary racial injustice—
despite many often thoughtful and well-intentioned caveats from behavioral realists that 
nonetheless tend to be rather abstract and overwhelmed in practice by suggested interventions 
that focus almost exclusively on the individual, psychologically based dynamics of  bias assessment 
and intervention. (Kahn 2018: 62) 
So while Kahn’s primary charge against behavioural realism arguably fails, the motivation for it stands. 
Even though behavioural realists don’t literally take racism “out of  history”, they do naturalise racism, 
and in a way that tends to obscure not only its historical roots, but crucially, the ways in which the 
cultural and institutional effects of  this history shape racist behaviour to this very day. When 
behavioural realists talk of  “physically locating” racial bias in the brain, or describe all forms of  racial 
bias as unfortunate consequences of  our evolved propensity for “in-group favouritism”, they make this 
framing error. What’s more, whether we actually biologise racism or simply frame the issue in a way that 
places the emphasis on its neurobiological causes, the upshot is still very much the same: we end up 
with an individualistic policy, which though well intended, often hinders the fight against racism.  
 It is instructive to place Kahn's concerns in the context of  other, similar, criticisms of  
psychological and scientific research on racism. A popular line of  critique contends that such work 
often “psychologises” racism. There are a few different ways of  spelling out this idea, but the general 
worry is that such work is too individualistic. For instance, Trawalter et al. (2020) take this to be the 
worry that such work focusses too much on individual biases and not enough on structural racism. In 
this way, the threat of  biologising and psychologising racism raise similar concerns. i.e. they both 
emphasis how certain, agent-centric conceptions of  racism draw attention and resources away from 
non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. This is not surprising given that psychologising racism 
is the broader phenomenon of  which biologising racism proves to be one instance.  Nevertheless, 8
biologising racism also brings with it its own shares of  specific concerns. As we have seen, it leads to 
 To psychologise racism, in effect, is to treat racism as a cognitive phenomenon, while to biologise it is 8
to treat racism as a neuro-cognitive phenomenon.
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the absurdity that we can cure racism with a pill. But perhaps even more worryingly, this itself  can be 
seen as an example of  the way biologising racism further legitimises quick and overly simplistic 
individualistic solutions to racism. As Khan notes, in bringing the “hard sciences” to bear on racism, 
“behavioural realism valorizes the scientific method as an autonomous means to solve complex social, 
historical, and political issues”, and thereby opens the door to the idea that there is an “ultimate 
technical fix” for such issues (pg. 13-14). 
 In Race on the Brain, Kahn’s target often shifts between biologised accounts racism and ones that 
psychologise racism more broadly. This is understandable given that his primary concerns, i.e. how 
behavioural realists frame racism and the opportunity costs to which this inevitably lead, are issues 
which dog both accounts. In this paper, my aim is to address these concerns, and in that regard, I take 
the situated solution on offer to be of  interest to those who have concerns with psychologising racism 
in general, as well as those especially sceptical of  its more recent, biologised incarnation.  9
2.2   Philosophical Responses 
As noted, Kahn is not the first to call our attention to how scientific research on racism, though well-
intended, focus on individualistic interventions at the expense of  ignoring the social and structural 
causes of  racism. The sociologist Wellman, for instance, raises several worries, one of  which is that 
“advocates of  cognitive neuroscience locate the sources of  discrimination in the minds (brains) of  
individual actors” (2007: 45), the upshot being that they can’t provide an examination of  organisational 
structures that enable discriminatory bias. Machery, Faucher and Kelly (2010) argue that critiques of  
psychological explanations of  racism, in general, rest on an overly simplified conception of  
psychological explanation. As for the aforementioned worry in particular, they respond that 
psychological explanations (i) acknowledge the social elements of  racism, (ii) often target social change, 
 It is worth noting that similar concerns have also been raised in other domains, e.g. biologising mental 9
disorder (e.g. Rose and Abi-Rached 2013) and neurologising crime (e.g. Fallin et al. 2018). Situated 
frameworks analogous to the one on offer in this paper should, ceteris paribus, prove relevant to 
addressing these concerns as well.
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(iii) suggest mechanisms for racism which are plastic, and (iv) produce data which could be used as part 
of  further strategies that target changes to institutional and social structures.  
 To elaborate, re-(i), they point out that psychologists often study the contextual effects on 
racism, with a focus on cues in our social environments that lead to both racist thought and behaviour. 
Moreover, re-(ii), they point out that psychologists often produce results which prescribe social 
remedies, e.g. they note that the work of  Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) suggests that one way to 
tackle racism is to increase the visibility of  images of  prominent and admired black individuals. Point 
(iii) is significant and not something we have addressed so far. While behavioural realists treat racial 
biases as a byproduct of  our natural propensity to categorise, they don’t take the categories we actually 
come up with as being inevitable. Racial biases stem from categorising practices that have their roots in 
harmful stereotypes, which is precisely why the sorts of  remedies mentioned in (ii) can be effective. 
Finally, re-(iv), they observe, “We see nothing preventing the suggestions one might draw from 
psychology from being incorporated into social action or policy, either in the form of  targeted changes 
to institutional or social structures” (pg. 243). It is certainly true that behavioural realism doesn’t rule 
out such collaborative ways of  combating racism.  
 Machery, Faucher and Kelly are thoughtful critics and succeed in waylaying many of  Wellman’s 
concerns.  However, I don’t think claims (i)-(iv) speak directly to Wellman and Kahn’s concerns 10
around framing and opportunity costs. Points (ii) and (iv), in particular, are telling. Re-(ii), behavioural 
realists do prescribe strategies to combat racism that can be classified as “social”. Nevertheless, these 
strategies still overwhelmingly focus on bringing about individual change. Positive representations of  
disenfranchised groups, e.g. ethnic minorities, women, or members of  the LGBTQI+ community, are 
all effective insofar as they push against harmful stereotypes dominant in our society. Moreover, they 
do so by making us rethink our stereotypes, by helping us replace our old categories with newer, less 
harmful, ones. But they don’t seek to bring about any structural change, be it social or institutional. As 
Banaji and Greenwald note, stereotypes, though exaggerations, have an element of  truth to them. A 
stereotype that represents most blacks as being poor, though technically false, might have its roots in 
 Like Kahn, Wellman arguably creates several strawpersons, including claiming that racism is seen by 10
cognitive neuroscientists as being both fixed and inevitable. 
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the fact that unemployment amongst blacks is at least twice as high as that amongst whites (Wilson 
2019). Simply “increasing the volume” of  images of  wealthy black celebrities will do nothing to address 
such income disparities. To an extent, Machery, Faucher and Kelly themselves seem to be aware of  this, 
for they grant that such psychological explanations won’t help address one of  Wellman’s examples: 
housing-related wealth inequality which stems from discrepancies in obtaining home-loans between 
whites and blacks. Unfortunately, they fail to appreciate the prevalence of  such structural inequalities, 
and thereby don’t recognise potential opportunity costs which come with the ever-increasing 
dominance of  psychological explanations of  racism over historical, social and structural explanations.  
 Pace (iv), these opportunity costs are also compounded in the way behavioural realists 
themselves frame racism. To reiterate, there is nothing about the neurocognitive data itself  that is 
contentious. I am also in agreement with Machery, Faucher and Kelly that there is no reason why we 
can’t deploy such data as part of  a broader strategy to combat the structural causes of  racism. (More on 
this in Section 4). The problem is that behavioural realists frame their results in a way that obscures 
such use. This is Kahn’s point. By framing racism as if  it were just a unified, individualistic, 
neurobiological phenomenon in our head, behavioural realists encourage the use of  their work as a 
master-narrative by which to address all of  our racial ills. For example, Banaji and Greenwald, as we 
saw earlier, claim (most) contemporary forms of  racism are best thought of  ‘mind bugs’ that stem 
form our natural propensity to categorise.  Framing racism in this manner, though feasible, draws our 
attention away from the structural causes which underly such categorisations in the first place. As 
Lawrence, another legal scholar, observes, “When the process of  categorization, rather than the 
content of  the categories, is our central concern, we turn our attention away from questions like, “Why 
is racism so ubiquitous in these categories?””(2008: 261). 
 One frustrating aspect of  challenges to behavioural realism is that they tend to pit a 
psychological science of  racism against the treatment of  racism in other disciplines, e.g. sociology 
(Wellman) or law (Kahn). This creates a false and unnecessary dichotomy. All of  these disciplines have 
important things to teach us about how to combat racism. (This, I understand, is also Machery, Faucher 
and Kelly’s position). The problem with the way behavioural realists tend to frame racism, however, is 
that it actively encourages this tension by proposing an individualistic, neurobiological understanding of  
9
racism at the expense of  obscuring other ways of  conceptualising racism. The philosophical defence of  
behavioural realism doesn’t adequately address this concern. 
3.   Situating Racism 
How should a psychological science frame racism in a way that doesn’t downplay the significance of  the 
historical, social and institutional contexts that shape racism? One way to do so is to draw on the 
growing literature on situated cognition in order to ‘situate’ racism in such contexts. ‘Situated cognition’ 
now refers to a broad range of  views with the main unifying idea being that cognition cannot be 
understood properly without “expanding our field of  view” (Griffiths and Scarantino 2005: 449). For 
example, cognition cannot be understood without taking into account the cultural, social and physical 
contexts in which it unfolds.   11
 One of  the central advantages of  a situated cognition framework is that it isn’t necessarily 
supposed to be incompatible with other frameworks. Rather, it is supposed to emphasis the need to 
take into account other factors typically neglected by those who study cognition simply by looking at 
what happens inside our cranium. This promises to be useful for our purposes, as it could help us 
situate the various cognitive biases studied by behavioural realists in environmental contexts, and 
thereby take into account at least some of  the factors which Kahn claims is neglected by the existing 
behavioural realist paradigm. In what follows, I draw on the literature on situated cognition to explain 
precisely how behavioural realists might situate the cognitive biases relevant for racism.  
3.1  Situated Cognition  
Advocates of  situated cognition typically emphasis the embodied and/or embedded nature of  
cognition. Cognition is embodied when it depends on bodily processes, whereas it is embedded when it 
depends on extra-bodily environmental processes. For our purposes, what is most salient is how 
cognition is embedded in environmental features like social and institutional structures. The basic idea 
is that cognition is dependent on environmental factors. But understood literally, this is something 
everyone can grant. As we saw, even behavioural realists grant that it is social and cultural factors that 
 See Wilson and Clark (2008) for an overview. 11
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shape the cognitive biases relevant for racism. What we want, then, is a non-trivial account of  how 
cognition depends on the environment; one that makes contextual features not just mere inputs into a 
distinct cognitive system, but one where these features are integral to cognition in a way not 
emphasised by traditional accounts. According to one such account, cognition is embedded in the sense 
that it is both guided and supported, or ‘scaffolded’, by our environment.   12
 According to the Scaffolded Mind Hypothesis (SMH), human cognitive capacities are depended 
on, and have been transformed by, resources in our environment (Sterelny 2010). This account draws 
on the niche construction model in evolutionary biology by Odling-Smee et al. (2003), which emphases 
how organisms carve out niches to which they subsequently adapt. Organisms manipulate their 
environment which in turn transforms the organisms themselves, often in a way that enhances their 
survival. The SMH draws on the idea of epistemic niche construction, where we humans modify our 
environments in a way that enhances our cognitive capacities. For example, we use environmental 
resources, like language, mathematical notations, notebooks, calculators, computers etc., to scaffold our 
intelligence. What is relevant for our purposes is that social organisation is also a form of  epistemic 
niche construction. Humans have modified their social environments in such a way that these 
environments play an active role in both the development and the preservation of  many of  our 
cognitive capacities.  Moreover, one important feature of  the way we socially and culturally scaffold our 
intelligence is through the transmission of  knowledge across generations, something Sterelny calls 
‘intergenerational social learning’.  Simply put, we inherit (modifiable) epistemic niches, which shape 13
our cognitive capacities.  
 Situated approaches to cognition are often put to the task of  explaining how reliable external 
resources help us reduce our cognitive load. More relevant for our purposes is the literature on the 
situated cognition of  emotion, which “emphasizes the role of  social context in the production and 
management of  an emotion, and the reciprocal influence of  emotion on the evolving social 
 This is a more conservative rival to the view that cognition literally ‘extends’ into the environment. 12
See Clark (2008) for a defence and Rupert (2009) for a critique.
 See also Sterelny (2003) and Heyes (2018).13
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context” (Griffiths and Scarantino 2005: 438).  This is a version of  the SMH, but with an emphasis on 14
how emotions are scaffolded by our socio-cultural environment. Besides an emphasis on social context, 
two further features make Griffiths and Scarantino’s account of  environmental scaffolding relevant for 
our purposes. First, they make a distinction between two types of  environmental scaffolding:  
Synchronically, the environment supports particular emotional performances - particular episodes of, 
say, anger or sadness ... Diachronically, the environment supports the development of  an ‘emotional 
phenotype’ or repertoire of  emotional abilities. Thus, the provision of  confessionals in churches enables 
certain kinds of  emotional performance (synchronic scaffolding), and the broader Catholic culture 
supports the development of  the ability to engage in the emotional engagements of  confession 
(diachronic scaffolding). (Griffiths and Scarantino 205: 443)  
On this view, the development of  a cognitive capacity, in this case emotion, can be scaffolded by our 
environments diachronically, i.e. over the course of  our lives, but such a capacity can also be scaffolded 
synchronically, i.e. in realtime, by the particular environment we happen to be in at a given moment.  
 Second, Griffiths and Scarantino also emphasis how emotion is ‘dynamically coupled’ to “an 
environment that both influences and is influenced by the unfolding of  the emotion” (Griffiths and 
Scarantino 2005: 438). The notion of  dynamic coupling is not unique to Griffiths and Scarantino’s 
account, but they place emphasis on how a cognitive capacity, i.e. emotion, is coupled to our socio-
cultural environments. Emotions unfold in social situations where they are responses to the behaviour 
of  subjects whose subsequent behaviour are shaped by these very responses. Both of  these features will 
prove crucial in explaining how racial biases are scaffolded by our environment. 
 It is worth noting that Griffiths and Scarantino’s account isn’t the only taxonomy of  scaffolding 
that might prove relevant for our concerns. As Varga points out, there are “several ways to taxonomize 
scaffoldings, such as by ontogenetic and phylogenetic aspects, by cognitive domains, or by the material 
constituents of  the scaffoldings” (2018: 50). The account we have looked at focusses on environmental 
scaffolding, as it pertains to the domain of  emotion. Varga’s own account, by contrast, is guided by 
 Also see Colombetti and Krueger (2014), and Stephan, Walter and Wilutzky (2014).14
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pragmatic and explanatory considerations concerning common symptoms in mental disorders. To this 
end, he makes a distinction between intrasomatic and extrasomatic scaffolding: respectively, scaffolding 
that involves one’s body, e.g. the sensorimotor system, and scaffolding that involves systems outside 
one’s body, e.g. props, devices and environmental structures. But he also introduces a form of  
extrasomatic scaffolding which he argues is neglected by the situated cognition literature, viz. 
intersomatic scaffolding that involves making use of  another’s body. His primary example is synchronic 
interaction patterns between infant and career, such as coordination and imitation, which can facilitate 
the infant’s emotion regulation; both in real-time and in the diachronic development of  the infant’s 
regulatory capacities.  
 For our purposes, we are interested in providing a situated account that is guided by pragmatic 
and explanatory considerations concerning racial biases, particularly considerations raised by Kahn’s 
critique of  behavioural realism. To this end, I will mainly follow Griffiths and Scarantino in focussing 
on environmental scaffolds; what Varga calls extrasomatic scaffolding. Moreover, my account will be 
conservative in the sense that I will mainly make use of  non-somatic forms of  extrasomatic 
scaffolding; ones which are analogous to those discussed by Griffiths and Scarantino, e.g. cases where a 
cognitive ability is guided and shaped by one’s socio-cultural environment. Whether intersomatic 
scaffolding proves relevant to racial biases is an intriguing prospect. (Racial biases, for instance, might 
be reinforced due to an absence of  the kinds of  synchronic interaction patterns that foster a sense of  
connectedness between individuals). However, working out the details of  how this may (or may not) 
happen is something I will leave for a later date. 
3.2   Scaffolding Racism 
To begin, I should clarify that the aim here is not to provide a situated account of  all racism. Racism is 
a multifaceted phenomenon, which in all likelihood requires a pluralistic treatment. The aim, rather, is 
to provide a situated approach to the various cognitive biases which underlie certain kinds racist 
behaviour and form the subject matter of  behavioural realism. Moreover, the underlying intention is to 
frame our study of  these biases in such a way that we no longer downplay the significance of  historical, 
social and institutional contexts that guide and support, i.e. scaffold, them.  
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 The basic idea driving a situated approach to racial bias is to emphasis socio-cultural influences 
on the development and management of  cognitive biases that underlie (some) racist behaviour, and the 
reciprocal influence such biases have on these socio-cultural factors themselves. As evident, racial biases 
can be environmentally scaffolded in two ways. First, various social and cultural contexts can 
diachronically scaffold the development of  various cognitive biases during various stages of  an 
individual’s lifespan. For example, negative stereotypes concerning black men and danger may lead to 
the development of  emotional and defence responses that trigger automatically in response to racial 
cues associated with black men (Phelps et al. 2000). Second, specific social and cultural contexts can 
also synchronically scaffold the manifestation of  various cognitive biases in realtime. For instance, far 
right events, which espouse various kinds of  negative stereotypes about non-whites, might prime their 
participants in such a way that these very events might synchronically scaffold certain cognitive biases, 
like anger and negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Let’s look at these more carefully.  
 A lot of  behavioural realist studies, especially ones which take advantage of  the latest 
technologies in neuroscience, study racial perception with a focus on the amygdala, “an area of  the 
brain that has been implicated in learned emotional responses” (Eberhardt 2005: 182).  Neuroimaging 15
studies, typically done on adults, routinely find differences in the amygdala activation for the perception 
of  African American faces in comparison to European American faces.  However, as Tezlar et al. 16
observe, “differential amygdala response to African American faces does not emerge until adolescence, 
reflecting the increasing salience of  race across development” (2013: 234). In particular, these 
differences become salient around 14 years. Tezler et al. suggest that this could be for a whole host of  
reasons, such as internal factors, e.g. puberty, as well as external factors such as an increase in cultural 
knowledge (e.g. implicit and explicit stereotypes around race) and self-explorations around ethnic 
 Recent work by LeDoux (2016) suggests that various neural circuits concerning the amygdala trigger 15
our defensive responses, but not necessarily the conscious experience of  fear itself. Most 
neuroscientists, e.g. Adolphs and Anderson (2018), are happy to use emotion terms to refer to internal 
brain states with physiological expressions, i.e. regardless of  whether they have accompanying 
phenomenologies.
 For a review see, Amodio (2014) and Chekroud et al. (2015).16
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identity. Moreover, they go on to conclude that “increasing salience of  race across development may 
shape the functional architecture of  the amygdala” (pg. 242). The question for us is how? Precisely how 
does development shape the architecture of  our brain? 
 Tezlar et al. themselves take the main lesson of  their research to be that neural biases to race are 
not “innate” but are rather a “social construction”. This may well be, but it doesn’t answer our 
question. Nor does it tell us whether the racial bias in question should itself  be identified with these 
neural biases, or whether it should be construed as a broader phenomenon, with the neural biases as an 
integral component. The situated framework is well-placed to provide answers to both questions. 
According to the framework, various environmentally embedded factors like stereotypes (along with 
possibly embodied factors, e.g. puberty) diachronically scaffold the development of  a neurobiological 
architecture, one where the amygdala becomes sensitive to certain racial cues. As for the racial bias 
itself, the situated framework suggests that it shouldn’t be reduced to an amygdala-centred neural 
circuitry. Rather, it should be understood as a situated phenomenon, one whose development is 
scaffolded by a host of  social and physical factors.  
 A potential response is to accept that the development of  various neural biases are shaped by 
our environment, but to insist that once they develop, certain racial biases themselves can be 
understood as nothing more than just these neural biases. Nothing I have said rules out such a 
reductive picture. However, the aim, recall, is to reframe psychological research on racial bias in a way 
that ensures we no longer ignore the social, historical and institutional factors that shape racism. A 
situated framework is more advantageous than a reductive one because it provides us with a way of  
addressing this concern. A situated approach to cognition is premised on the idea that (some) cognitive 
capacities cannot be understood without taking into account the cultural, social and physical contexts in 
which they unfold. Here we see that our ability to emotionally respond to various racial cues is one that 
cannot be understood without taking account of  the epistemic niches in which we find ourselves. This 
sense of  not being able to fully grasp certain cognitive capacities without taking into account their 
situated nature is only compounded when we take into account other elements of  situated cognition, 
e.g. synchronic scaffolding and dynamic coupling. 
15
 So far we have looked at socio-cultural influences on the development of  cognitive biases that 
underlie racist behaviour. But socio-cultural factors also influence their management. In other words, a 
lot of  our racial biases are synchronically scaffolded by our social contexts. This is true of  implicit 
biases more generally. For instance, in reviewing the empirical literature, Nosek and Riskind (2012) 
note: 
Implicit social cognition is contextualized. This means that it is a function of  both the preexisting 
content inside the person and the social circumstance in which it occurred (Blair, 2002; Gawronski & 
Sritharan, 2010; Lewin, 1943). Despite their automatic generation, implicit evaluations are sensitive to 
social circumstances, such as contextual clues about the valence of  the social target (Barden, Maddux, 
Petty, & Brewer, 2004), viewing positive or negative instances before evaluating a social category 
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010), participants’ motivation to affiliate with 
another person whose beliefs are readily apparent (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005), or even 
mental and physiological states, such as implicit evaluations of  smoking among habitual smokers 
following relative deprivation from smoking (Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007; Sherman, Rose, 
Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003). (Nosek and Riskind 2012: 122) 
Some, such as Payne et al. (2017), argue that most systematic variance in implicit bias is situational. We 
needn’t take a stand on this in this paper. The point is, race-based implicit biases are often context-
dependent. For example, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) found exposure to pictures of  admired 
blacks and disliked whites can reduce automatic preferences for whites over blacks. In particular, they 
found immediately after exposure, as well as 24hrs later, subjects showed a significant decrease in pro-
white bias when measured using the IAT. These effects are well-known. Moreover, they also fit nicely 
into our framework. Racial biases, as measured by the IAT, are often scaffolded, synchronically, by 
social contexts. 
 Racial biases also appear to be dynamically coupled to their environment. The basic idea here is 
that our cognitive capacities are coupled to an environment that both shapes and is shaped by these 
capacities. Precisely how this plays out in the racial context is more speculative, as it isn’t a feature 
directly measured by existing behavioural realist studies. Nevertheless, I mention it here because such a 
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coupling seems to be an important feature of  how racial biases are environmentally embedded, and 
thereby might also prove crucial in working out ways to prevent or mitigate such biases. For example, 
racist attitudes towards African Americans might lead to law-enforcement officials acting more 
aggressively towards black suspects than to other racialised groups, which in turn might lead to such 
suspects acting in a more panicked and/or aggressive manner towards such officials than other 
suspects, thus creating a self-reinforcing and escalating pattern of  aggression. This would explain why 
police checks for fairly mundane offences, like traffic violations, disproportionately result in violence or 
death when the suspects are black.  
 The unfolding of  such dynamic agent-environment interactions prove difficult to replicate in a 
laboratory setting, but some aspects of  these interactions are empirically born out. For instance, 
Eberhardt (2020) notes that black drivers stopped for traffic violations are twice as more likely than 
white drivers to be pulled over for high discretionary equipment violation instead of  moving violations. 
Moreover, her studies also show that based on words alone, participants were able to tell whether a 
police officer was interacting with a white or black driver. (Police officers, both black and white, were 
found to be less respectful of  black drivers than white). These sorts of  factors make it likely that black 
drivers would behave differently to white drivers when pulled over. If  there actually are such 
differences, they would be examples of  the kinds reciprocal influence racial biases can have on the 
social environment itself. 
 In summary, a situated approach to race-based cognitive biases eschews an individualistic, 
biologised understanding of  such biases for one which ‘situates’ them in our social and cultural 
environments. Racial biases of  the kind studied by behavioural realists, as we saw, can be treated as 
embedded phenomena, both scaffold by, and coupled with, our socio-cultural environments. Since the 
embedded nature of  these biases are integral to both their production and management, a situated 
perspective helps us reframe racial biases in a way that makes these environmental influences hard to 
ignore. On these grounds, I think a future science of  racism will do well to adopt a situated approach to 
racism to guard against opportunity costs which result from the individualist narratives that typically 
frame such research.  
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4. Merits and Limitations  
The situated approach to racial bias I have spelt out in this paper is closest to Griffiths and Scarantino’s 
situated approach to emotion. Unsurprisingly, my approach shares many of  the advantages they claim 
for their approach. It is worth quoting them in full:  
The real theoretical payoff  of  the situated perspective on emotions is methodological. By shifting 
theoretical focus from the intrapsychic to the interpersonal, from the unbidden to the strategic, from the 
short lived to the long lived, from the context independent to the context dependent, from the static to 
the dynamic, the situated perspective points the attention of  the research community to aspects of  
emotions that have been unduly neglected and that may hold the key to understanding the nature and 
function of  a large class of  emotions. These aspects of  emotion have not been entirely ignored, of  
course .., but we think they would have become more central if  a broader perspective on the mind 
suitable to encourage them had been available. (Griffiths and Scarantino 2005: 448-9) 
Such methodological payoffs are directly relevant to our concerns. We began this paper with Kahn’s 
objection that behavioural realism threatens to biologise racism, which in turn hinders approaches to 
tackle the social, historical and institutional causes of  racism. I have argued that current work in 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience doesn’t actually biologise racism in the sense of  reducing it to a 
purely biological phenomenon. However, I have also argued that Kahn is right to point out that such 
sciences do have a framing problem: they often frame their research in a way which targets the 
individual, neurobiological features of  our cognitive biases whilst ignoring, and even obscuring, other 
factors integral to their production and management.  
 The theoretical payoffs of  a situated approach to such biases is that it shifts our focus, and 
helps us target features typically neglected by behavioural realist approaches. As in standard theories of  
emotion, dominant theories in a science of  racial bias don’t neglect socio-cultural influences on their 
subject matter. As we have seen, behavioural realists are explicit that what they are studying are the 
effects of  socio-cultural features, like negative stereotypes. Nevertheless, as we have also seen, such 
factors tend to be relegated to the position of  being mere background conditions. By contrast, a 
situated approach to racial bias makes these environmental influences more central to scientific 
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research. Such a science aims to understand not just individual cognitive biases, but how the 
development and management of  these biases are scaffolded by, and coupled with, our socio-cultural 
environment. I have argued that this way of  “expanding our field of  view” helps us address significant 
aspects of  Kahn’s concerns. 
 To be clear, there are approaches, especially within social psychology, that already advocate a 
more expansive understanding of  racism. As Murphy et al. (2018) observe, it is ironic that for a field 
that touts the power of  situational factors, social psychology mostly ends up locating prejudice within 
people, not places. But there are exceptions. For example, the “socio-contextual” (Murphy et al. 2018), 
“cultural-psychological” (Salter et al. 2018) and “integrative” (Trawalter et al. 2020) approaches to 
racism stress the impact of  social, cultural, and historical-cum-structural contexts on individual biases, 
and ergo to varying degrees can be seen as examples of  situated approaches. The integrative approach, 
for instance, expands our viewpoint in the following sense: 
From a theoretical perspective, it invites us to (A) broaden theory to consider history and structures; and 
then (B) identify psychological mechanisms and phenomena that connect history and structures to 
outcomes. From a methodological perspective, it suggests a multi-pronged approach. To study individual 
and institutional racism, we can (1) measure exposure to systems and structures, and test associations 
with psychological mechanisms and outcomes; (2) manipulate salience of  historical harms or systems; 
and (3) leverage ‘natural experiments’. (Trawalter et al. 2018) 
In advocating this approach, Trawalter et al. note that “too often [psychology] has failed to 
contextualize individual biases within historically created and presently upheld structures” (pg. 47). One 
of  their examples is the police use of  force, e.g. that police officers are more than three times as likely 
to shoot a black person than a white person. The dominant behavioural realist frame attempts to 
understand this through the lens of  individual biases, such as ‘mind-bugs’ and in-group favouritism. 
This, as Trawalter et al. argue, neglects the history of  institutional violence against blacks by police, as 
well other structural factors, like residential segregation and economic disparities. An integrative 
approach, by contrast, aims to understand the link between such factors and individual bias, and does 
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so by encouraging social psychologists to draw on the wealth of  material found in other disciplines, e.g. 
history, law, African American studies, sociology, economics etc.  
 Trawalter et al. themselves don’t elaborate on the matter, but it is not hard to see how 
psychologists working on racial biases could, in a more general sense, be receptive to work done in such 
disciplines. For example, in his comparative study of  Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa and Jim 
Crow U.S.A, the historian Fredrickson (2015) traces the history of  Western racism and argues that it is 
not a “natural or virtually inevitable human response to encounters with strangers” but a “historical 
construction associated with the rise of  modernity and with specific national or international 
contexts” (pg. 99). This in turn leads Fredrickson to a more expansive understanding of  racism, one 
which involves the combination of  a set of  beliefs or attitudes with a set of  practices, structures and 
institutions. Racism, understood from such a historical (and geographical) frame, then, cannot simply 
be reduced to a neurobiological phenomenon.  What’s more, it suggests that racial biases, even of  the 
variety studied by behavioural realists, don't (just) stem from our natural propensities to categorise. 
Rather, they occur when such propensities combine with certain historically created ideologies that 
remain embedded in our cultural and institutional practices. Behavioural realists could be more sensitive 
to such factors, e.g. by examining not just how certain instances of  racism link up with individual 
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cognitive biases, but how these biases themselves link up with certain historical and structural 
contexts.  17
 Since there already exists various approaches that encourage a more expansive understanding of  
racism, what use is there for the situated approach advocated in this paper? The main benefit is that it 
provides a broader framework by which to consider these existing approaches. This is important 
because it helps us unify these approaches under a single research scheme, which in turn helps us 
consider, collectively, approaches that place emphasis on different situational factors, e.g. the interplay 
between group-membership and organisational structures in propagating prejudice (e.g. Murphy et al.) 
or the role of  “racist affordances”, i.e. cultural-cum-social cues, in directing individual bias (e.g. Salter et 
al.). Moreover, by doing so, we can also be clearer on which elements of  the broader situated approach 
are stressed or neglected by a given approach. For instance, the socio-contextual and integrative 
approaches are good at encouraging us to look at how racism is both diachronically and synchronically 
scaffolded by institutional structures, but they neglect the way racial bias can be dynamically coupled to 
such structures. By contrast, the cultural-psychological approach considers both how cultural contexts 
shape racist habits of  mind and how these habits in turn shape and maintain such contexts. In this way, 
by considering existing approaches as part of  a broader, situated framework, we are able to better 
ensure that we pay attention to the full gamut of  ways racial biases are environmentally embedded.  
 While social psychologists typically focus on the effects of  people on prejudice, there is a growing 17
body of  work that examines the link between environmental factors (e.g. culture, institutions and 
history) and prejudice. For example, Payne et al. (2019) compared contemporary implicit bias rates 
within counties with the proportion of  the population enslaved in them in 1860. They take their results 
to support the claim that implicit bias is a “cognitive residue of  past and present structural inequalities” 
(pg. 11693). Also see the studies undertaken by Bonam, Bergsieker and Eberhardt (2016) which 
demonstrate how physical spaces linked to African Americans can be subject to negative racial 
stereotypes, and those by Salter and Adams (2016) which examine how representations of  black history 
month can promote (or impede) perception of  racism and anti-racist efforts. Behavioural realists 
should do more to incorporate such results in how they frame their own work. 
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 As I see it, the main limitation with the situated approach is that it doesn’t fully accommodate 
all of  the features which Kahn claims is ignored by behavioural realism. More specifically, it doesn’t 
directly take into account certain dimensions of  the historical and institutional causes of  racism. In this 
paper I have focussed mainly on social and cultural elements of  racial bias, partly because they are, 
uncontroversially, central to contemporary forms of  racial bias, and partly because existing situated 
approaches tend to also focus on socio-cultural factors, making it east to see how to flesh out a situated 
approach to racial bias which makes these factors a key part of  our research program. We have also just 
seen, albeit briefly, how a situated framework might look at the effects of  history and institutions on 
individual biases. What we haven’t seen, however, is the impact of  historical and institutional factors on 
racism that outstrip our cognitive biases. Wellman’s example of  housing-related wealth inequality is a 
case in point:  
Because fewer Blacks can obtain mortgage loans, and when they do obtain them they do so on less 
favorable terms, the value of  the housing they purchase is lower on average than the value of  housing 
purchased by Whites. White flight compounds the problem; the value of  Black housing declines as 
Whites move out, making it more difficult for new Black buyers to obtain loans at reasonable rates of  
interest. The circle is completed when banks redline black neighborhoods, leading to downward spiral 
of  disinvestment. African Americans, consequently, accumulate less wealth with devastating 
consequences. (Wellman 2007: 58)  
 In responding to this example, Machery, Faucher and Kelley grant that there is no obvious need 
to appeal to psychological states to explain this phenomenon, and therefore agree with Wellman that 
“some cases of  racism can be adequately explained without mentioning psychological causes” (pg. 236). 
I think that’s right. Behavioural realism takes as its explanatory target the cognitive biases which 
underlie certain kinds racist behaviour. As Kahn notes, like behavioural economists, they “apply 
cognitive theories to address pressing legal and policy issues” (pg. 64). In this paper, I have provided a 
situated framework by which to examine how our environments shape our cognitive biases. Such a 
framework is well-positioned to draw attention to the sorts of  historical and institutional factors that 
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scaffold these biases. However, crucially, it will leave unaddressed any non-agential factors that 
propagate racial subordination.   
 Put another way, I have been proposing a way we might transpose a situated approach to 
cognition onto existing research programs in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. This, I think, can 
be done by drawing on other areas of  psychology, such as developmental psychology and social 
psychology.  However, I don’t see an analogous area of  psychology that studies the impact of  18
historical and institutional structures on racial inequality which outstrip our cognitive biases. The 
various sub-disciplines within psychology, as well as those  related to it such as cognitive neuroscience, 
simply don’t take such structures as their explanatory targets. Subsequently, for all that I say here, a 
future psychological science of  racism will, in all likelihood, leave certain fundamental underlying 
causes of  racial inequality untouched.  
 That said, I don’t think this limitation is damning. The reach of  any individual discipline, by its 
very nature, is bound to be modest, especially when tackling a multifaceted phenomenon as complex as 
racism. A psychological science can only hope to tackle certain aspects of  this phenomenon, which 
again presses the need for an interdisciplinary approach, one that includes insights from history, 
sociology, law etc. To that extent Kahn is right. And his point should not be understated. The penchant 
of  law and policy makers, in recent years, for deferring to a science of  implicit bias, arguably, has come 
at a cost of  sidelining ways to address the underlying structural causes of  racism. However, I think he is 
also wrong to press that such a science should only play a cursory role. As we saw, a situated approach 
can help us reframe existing research programs in both cognitive psychology and neuroscience to 
accommodate various environmental  factors indispensable to an explanation of  race-based cognitive 
biases This should ward off  any threat of  biologising racism, and with it, one would expect, many of  
the opportunity costs which come from placing race on the brain. 
 Griffiths and Scarantino’s situated approach to emotion, for instance, draws on the work of  social 18
psychologists Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005). Likewise, as mentioned earlier, a situated 
approach to racism can draw on the work done by social psychologists such as Payne et al. (2019), 
Bonam, Bergsieker and Eberhardt (2016), and Salter and Adams (2016).
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